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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT, 
& ESPLIN, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Department of Employment 
Security, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 930645-CA 
Priority No. 7 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to §78-2a-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except 
the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;... 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the Board of Review act in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner in determining that the attorney's fees award should be no 
different in light of the Appellate Court's view that the Board had 
erred earlier in finding that the hearings before the 
Administrative Law Judge were only four (4) hours in length? 
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2. Was the claimant below, Abraham Karbakhsh, denied "due 
process" within the meaning of R562-18B-3.5, which would preclude 
in some other way an opportunity for due process? 
3. Under Section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah, 
is the limitation of attorney's fees as applied in this case an 
effective denial of a remedy by due course of law? 
4. Is the limitation of attorney's fees effectively a denial 
of due process of law pursuant to Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution? 
5. Was Appellant denied due process of law, pursuant to 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
constitution, after remand from this Court, where the Board 
considered evidence and arguments outside the record below without 
allowing Appellant an opportunity to be heard to present additional 
evidence or arguments? 
The standard of review for each issue stated above is as 
follows: 
(A) For issue l above, in considering an appeal from a state 
agency, the standard of review is that an appellate court may grant 
relief if the agency action is based upon a determination of fact 
made or implied by the agency that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court 
(§63-46b-16(4)(g), Utah Code Annotated), Substantial evidence is 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion. Johnson v. Dept. of Emp. 
Security, 782 P.2d 965 at 968 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
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(B) For issues 2, 3, 4 and 5 above, constitutional questions 
are characterized as questions of law, and under sub-section (4)(d) 
of §63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated, agency determinations of law, 
which include interpretations of the state and federal 
constitutions, and are to be reviewed under a correction of error 
standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision. Questar 
Pipeline Co, v. Utah State Tax Commission, 817 P.2d 316 (Ut. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant represented Abraham Karbakhsh in a hearing before 
Kenneth A. Major, Administrative Law Judge, to determine Mr. 
Karbakhsh's eligibility for unemployment benefits. Mr. Karbakhsh 
had been charged with theft by deception as a basis to deny 
benefits under §35-4-5(b)(2) of the Utah Code, However, since the 
charges were dismissed at the preliminary hearing, the reasons for 
denial of benefits were thereafter considered under §35-4-5(b)(1), 
Utah Code Annotated. 
Mr, Karbakhsh sought counsel to represent him in his claim for 
unemployment benefits and originally retained counsel in the Salt 
Lake City area. Said counsel progressed in the case to a point and 
then Mr. Karbakhsh approached Appellant and indicated that his Salt 
Lake counsel was too expensive and that he could not afford to go 
forward with his claims against WordPerfect Corporation under the 
arrangements he had with said counsel. 
Mr. Karbakhsh solicited Appellant to represent him in three 
related matters, 1) his claim for unemployment benefits, 2) an 
unlawful discrimination claim pending before the Equal Employment 
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Opportunity Commission and 3) a wrongful termination claim against 
WordPerfect Corporation, Based on the complexity of his case, he 
was advised that Appellant would provide two (2) attorneys, one (1) 
of which had successfully represented him in the criminal charges 
and that the total fee would be Four Thousand Three Hundred Dollars 
($4,300.00) for the three matters. Mr. Karbakhsh accepted the 
employment agreement and paid Appellant Four Thousand Three Hundred 
Dollars ($4,300.00). 
In sharp contrast to the usual hearing which lasts from 45 
minutes to one hour, this hearing was some 13 hours of hearing time 
continued twice to hearing dates one week apart. Furthermore, the 
transcripts generated during the hearings were many times more than 
the usual volume in such proceedings. The employer called seven 
(7) of its paid employees as witnesses, and one (1) former employee 
and a third-party witness, in presenting its case. (R. at 6). 
Following the hearing, Appellant submitted its claim for 
attorney's fees in the amount of Four Thousand Three Hundred 
Dollars ($4,300.00) which included the time of two (2) attorneys 
for preparation for the case and attending over 13 hours of hearing 
time. (R. at 4,5). The Administrative Law Judge limited the fees 
to One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-six and 50/100 Dollars 
($1,436.50), 25 percent (25%) of claimant's maximum unemployment 
entitlement of Five Thousand Seven Hundred Forty-six Dollars 
($5,74 6.00) pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R562-18b-3.5. 
Appellant's challenge to the Commission's finding that the 
hearings had lasted for only four (4) hours was upheld by this 
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Appellate Court, and it issued an Order of Remand, (R. at 38), to 
that effect, ordering the Board of Review to reconsider the matter 
in light of the Court1s finding of error. 
The Board of Review affirmed the Administrative Law Judgefs 
decision providing not even a bare minimum of its reasoning behind 
its decision• However, the Board of Review did rely on evidence 
that was not part of the record, in affirming the Administrative 
Law Judge's decision, without affording to the Appellant any means 
of either refuting this external evidence, or any other means of 
presenting its side of the case. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS 
The Board of review acted in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner in determining the attorney's fees. The Board failed to 
point out any factual evidence in the record to support its 
decision. Further, the reasoning set out by the Board in 
justifying its decision is based on factual inaccuracies. 
The claimant below, Abraham Karbakhsh, was denied due process 
within the meaning of Rule 562-18B-3.5, which would preclude an 
opportunity for due process in other ways. The Administrative Code 
allows for a waiver of the 25 percent (25%) ceiling on allowable 
attorney's fees. Due process considerations require a waiver of 
this ceiling in the present situation, and further require an award 
of attorney's fees consistent with Appellant's claims. 
The limitation of attorney's fees as applied in this case is 
an effective denial of a remedy by due course of law under Section 
11 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah, and effectively a 
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denial of due process of law pursuant to Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Board erred in its application of the due process 
provision of Rule 562-18B-3.5. Further, in considering evidence 
and arguments outside the record, and denying the Appellant an 
opportunity to be heard to present additional evidence or 
arguments, the Appellant was denied due process of law. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER IN 
DETERMINING THAT THE ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD SHOULD BE NO DIFFERENT 
THAN ITS EARLIER DECISION WHICH WAS BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS FINDING 
THAT THE HEARINGS WERE ONLY FOUR (4) HOURS IN LENGTH. 
A. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FACTUAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS 
DECISION, THE BOARD ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
MANNER IN TAKING ITS DECISION. 
In its Decision dated July 27, 1992, the Board of Review 
erroneously found that the hearing before the Administrative Law 
Judge "lasted approximately four (4) hours and the attorneys had 
several consultation sessions with the claimant." Arguably, the 
grant of a lower fee is consistent with the Board fs finding that 
less time was involved than actually was involved. However, 
subsequently, pursuant to an Order of Remand by the Appellate 
Court, (R. at 38), the Board acknowledged its error and accepted 
that the hearings had lasted approximately 13 hours. Despite this 
acknowledgement, the Board chose to affirm its earlier decision 
without citing much insight regarding its choice. 
The Board of Reviewfs decision, dated September 10, 1993, (R. 
at 63), is replete with factual inaccuracies, which arguably form 
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the basis of its decision* The assertion that throughout the 
hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, the claimant Mr. 
Karbakhsh " .... was represented by two attorneys from the law firm 
and was billed accordingly.", (R. at 63) , does not find any support 
from the record; and is in fact incorrect. In actuality, because 
of prior commitments, neither attorney could devote full time to 
either preparation or attendance at the hearings. (R. at 4,5). 
The times when both attorneys were present was due to the demands 
of the case and not merely an attempt to run up legal fees by the 
Appellant. In any case, the Board's decision itself fails to shed 
any light on how the alleged presence of both attorneys throughout 
the hearings is relevant to the Board's decision. In the complete 
absence of any such elucidation, Appellant is left to its own 
devices to infer a conclusion from this assertion and its relation 
to the Board's ultimate decision. Arguably, if the Board was 
trying to justify its decision for limiting the Appellant's fees by 
showing that these fees were generated by time spent on the case 
that was really not required to be spent, then obviously the Board 
committed an error, and its ultimate finding is similarly 
erroneous. 
The Board also chooses to characterize the underlying 
proceeding of claimant Karbakhsh as a "....fairly straightforward 
legal matter underlying this dispute (did the employer have just 
cause for discharging the claimant) , it was unnecessary of the law 
firm to represent the claimant with two attorneys and then charge 
him for it." (R. at 64). Appellees of their own admissions have 
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stated in their earlier brief that the underlying proceeding 
referred to, lasted over 13 times more than the length of the 
average proceeding, and produced a record that was many times as 
voluminous as the average. And yet, the Appellees are seeking to 
escape the inexorable conclusion of their own admissions that this 
was a considerably more complex and lengthy proceeding than the 
average hearing, by trying to characterize it as a fairly 
straightforward legal matter. 
The Board of Review asserts that it was unnecessary for the 
law firm to represent the claimant with two attorneys and charge 
him for the fairly straightforward legal matter underlying this 
dispute. (R. at 64) The parties obviously did not find the matter 
as straightforward as the Board now claims. Consistent with its 
view of the complexity of the case, WordPerfect Corporation 
employed the services of at least two attorneys at Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker, (R. at 6), in addition to two of their own full time in-
house counsel, and also introduced nine (9) witnesses, all of whom 
had been well prepared to testify. (R. at 6). 
Therefore, the Board's decision seems to rest on factual 
inaccuracies and mere bald assertions that are totally unsupported 
by any evidence in the record, even though the Board does assert 
that, "After careful consideration of the record in this matter, 
the Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge to be a correct application of the provisions of the Utah 
Employment Security Act, supported by competent evidence and, 
therefore, affirms the decision." (R. at 64). Yet the Board's 
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enumeration of its decision is singularly lacking in any kind of 
substantive evidence in the record, that would support such a 
decision. In Robert G. Beloud, Inc. v. Workers Compensation 
Appeals Bd. , 50 Cal. App. 3d 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) , the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth District annulled the decision of the 
Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, for failure to state evidence 
relied upon and specify in detail the reasons for its decision. 
The Court held that a recitation by the Board that the fee allowed 
was reasonable in view of time, effort, and skill expended and 
result achieved was not sufficient. The Court further said that, 
"Decisions of Worker's Compensation Appeals Board must be 
rationally related to factors germane to resolution of particular 
problem and must be supported by substantial evidence in light of 
whole record." Id. 
Considering the total lack of any supporting evidence to 
justify its decision, and the lack of any cogent reasoning for the 
same, the Board's decision can only be characterized as arbitrary 
and capricious. In McCluskey v. Industrial Commission. 296 P.2d 
443 (Ariz. 1956), the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed an award of 
the Industrial Commission fixing attorney's fees for an attorney of 
a claimant in a workmen's compensation case, under the relevant 
Arizona statute. The Court held that the Commission could not be 
arbitrary or unreasonable in the exercise of its discretion in 
fixing attorney's fees. Id. 
The Board cites Utah Administrative Code R562-18B-3.5, 
Approval of Counsel Fees, as its justification for the limitation. 
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The cited section has been deemed to be an absolute mandate as 
interpreted by the Board. Appellants submit for the Courtfs 
consideration that the cited section has been improperly 
interpreted and applied by the Board under the present fact 
situation, and will address this issue in a following section of 
this brief. 
B. APPELLANT'S POSITION OF BEING AWARDED REASONABLE FEES IS 
SUPPORTED BY PRIOR CASE AUTHORITY IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
The Board also cites Thatcher v. Industrial Commission, 207 
P.2d 178 (Utah 1949), (R. at 64), for the proposition that 
attorney's fee recovery in worker's compensation cases is governed 
by a blanket fee limitation rule, which admits no exceptions, and 
which arguably allows for arbitrary and capricious decisions like 
the one under review. On the contrary, Thatcher is merely an 
elaboration of the rule of reasonableness, seeking to balance the 
best interests of workmen's compensation claimants and the 
attorneys who represent them. In Thatcher, a widow claimed 
compensation for the death of her husband while employed by 
another. She claimed that when he was injured, he was employed by 
"Sholty." At issue was the question of whether or not the deceased 
was employed by "Sholty" or "Seashore." The Commission decided 
that at the time of his injury, the deceased was employed by 
"Seashore" and therefore not covered by workman's compensation. 
Mrs. Rosenbaum then consulted with plaintiffs, Thatcher, who agreed 
to take her case and seek a reversal of the Commission's order 
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denying the award. The plaintiffs also agreed to accept a 
reasonable fee to be determined if plaintiffs were successful. 
Plaintiffs eventually were successful and agreed with Mrs. 
Rosenbaum upon a fee of One Thousand Dollars ($1#000.00). On 
remittitur, the Commission vacated its previous order denying the 
award and entered an order awarding to the dependents of the 
decedent benefits in the sum of Seven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty 
Dollars ($7,250.00). The commission also fixed the fee of the 
plaintiffs for legal services at Three Hundred Seventy-five Dollars 
($375.00). Plaintiffs thereupon filed with the Industrial 
Commission their Application for Rehearing on the ground that the 
sum of Three Hundred Seventy-five Dollars ($375.00) was inadequate 
for the services performed and that One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) was a reasonable fee. The Petition for Rehearing was 
denied by the Commission and the matter was appealed to the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Commission and 
remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with the 
views expressed in the Opinion. 
Among the views expressed by the Supreme Court regarding the 
reasonableness of attorney's fees are the following: 
"While attorneys may not hope to be compensated to the 
full measure of their time and work, they must not be 
limited to such niggardly fees that they cannot afford to 
accept compensation cases. And particularly, where it 
has become necessary to carry a compensation case to this 
Court should the Commission be at least moderately 
liberal in the allowance of attorneyfs fees...." 
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"It thus transpires that while the attorney and client 
compensation cases may have freedom of contract to agree 
on a fee for services performed by the attorney before 
the Industrial Commission and before the Supreme Court, 
such contract is not binding on the Commission and no 
greater sum may be charged than that fixed by the 
Industrial Commission, if the fee so fixed by it is 
within the limits of reasonableness even though the 
parties have agreed on a larger sum...." 
In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to 
consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty 
and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill 
requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether the 
acceptance of employment in the particular case will 
preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases 
likely to arise out of the transaction and in which there 
is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be 
employed, or would involve the loss of other employment 
while employed in the particular case or antagonisms with 
other clients; (3) the customary charges of the Bar for 
similar services; (4) the amount involved in the 
controversy and for the benefits resulting to the client 
from the services; (5) the contingency or certainty of 
the compensation; and (6) the character of the 
employment, whether casual or for an established and 
constant client. No one of these considerations in 
itself is controlling. 
The matter should be reversed and/or remanded with directions 
to correct the findings consistent with the record in this 
case." (Thatcher v. Industrial Commission. 207 P.2d 178, 182, 
183, 184 (Utah 1949) 
Therefore, Appellant's position is consonant with the dictates 
of Thatcher that attorney's fees should bear a relationship with 
the amount of effort put in, and subject to the due process 
limitations of Rule R562-18B-3. 
As such, the Board's decision is arbitrary and capricious, and 
cannot stand in the face of its unreasonableness. 
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POINT II 
THE CLAIMANT BELOW, ABRAHAM KARBAKHSH, WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF RULE 562-18B-3.5, WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE AN 
OPPORTUNITY FOR DUE PROCESS IN OTHER WAYS 
The claimant in the proceeding below was effectively denied 
his rights to due process of law by the limitation on the 
attorney's fees as interpreted or dictated by the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. The Utah Administrative Code provides at-R562-
18B-3.5 as follows: 
Fees will not be approved in excess of 25% of the 
claimant's maximum unemployment benefit entitlement 
unless such a limitation would preclude the claimant from 
pursuing an appeal to the Supreme Court or would preclude 
in some other way an opportunity for due process. 
(Emphasis Added.) 
According to the administrative code, if the 25 percent (25%) 
limit would preclude an appeal or preclude in some other way an 
opportunity for due process, the 25 percent (25%) ceiling on the 
fees allowable to attorneys for the claimant may be avoided. In 
allowing for higher attorney's fees in the event an appeal was 
taken, the drafters of this provision recognized that unusual 
circumstance justified the setting aside of the limitation on fees. 
Implicit in the notion of allowing higher fees in the appeal 
is that the number of hours of attorney time involved would be far 
more than in the usual case and that because of the extra time 
commitment for attorneys in a case, there would be a substantial 
dis-incentive to protect the rights of a claimant if there was no 
adequate compensation for the additional time required to prosecute 
the appeal. Similarly in this case, the amount of attorney time 
involved was far more than that involved in the usual case. In 
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this case the hearing lasted at least 13 hours and was continued 
over a period of two (2) weeks, which was considerably more than 
the usual hearing contemplated by Rule 562-18B-3.5. As such, the 
proceedings under issue are of the kind that could not have been 
intended to be covered under a blanket application of the rule. 
Further, the Administrative Code provides that due process of 
law may justify avoidance of the limit. Under the Constitution of 
the United States, the proceeding or hearing requisite to due 
process must be appropriate, fair, adequate, and such as is 
practicable and reasonable in the particular case. It must be an 
orderly proceeding, adapted to the nature of the case, in which the 
person to be affected has an opportunity to defend, enforce, and 
protect his rights. The fundamental requirement of due process is 
the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner. Since the essential reason for the due process 
requirement of a hearing prior to deprivation of property is to 
prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of property, such hearing 
must provide a real test. (See 16A Am Jur 2d 841 and cases cited 
thereunder.) Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, there 
is no provision allowing a hearing before the Administrative Law 
Judge or the Board of Review regarding the issue of attorney's fees 
charged to the claimant. 
Unusual circumstances exist in this case which justify 
departure from the 25 percent (25%) ceiling on attorney's fees. In 
this case, the claimant, Mr. Karbakhsh, was accused of taking a 
large number of used and some new floppy disk drives suitable for 
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use in personal computers from his employer under circumstances 
amounting to theft by deception or a fraudulent taking of property. 
The hearing was much more like a criminal trial than like the usual 
hearing for unemployment benefits. The employerfs strategy as 
evident by its presentation was intended as a pre-emptive strike 
precluding the claimant's pursuit of a wrongful termination claim 
and his pending unlawful discrimination claim before the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. The employer called nine (9) 
witnesses to establish the alleged fraudulent statements made by 
the claimant and thereafter introduced documents and other 
witnesses to establish the falsity of the statements to prove the 
falsity of the statements made by Mr. Karbakhsh. The employer's 
case alone, from the recollection of counsel for the claimant, 
involved eight (8) to nine (9) hours of hearing time before any 
witnesses were called on behalf of the claimant. 
At the hearings before the Administrative Law Judge, the 
employer, WordPerfect Corporation, hired two (2) attorneys to 
represent its interests and made available seven (7) employees and 
one (1) prior employee as witnesses in the case. Mr. Karbakhsh had 
the right to have equal access to counsel of his choosing to fairly 
and thoroughly represent his interests before the Administrative 
Law Judge. In this case, the proceeding was more like a 
prosecutorial proceeding in which the wealthy employer, as 
prosecutor, availed itself of many paid witnesses, and a staff of 
attorneys to marshall the evidence, prepare witnesses, and present 
a well prepared case to the Administrative Law Judge. Mr. 
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Karbakhsh, on the other hand, with his relatively meager funds, 
attempted to defend his rights to unemployment compensation with 
skilled counsel hampered, as is usually the case, by his inability 
to interview witnesses then employed by WordPerfect Corporation, 
who understandably enough were reluctant to testify against their 
employer, as well as his lack of funds to be able to secure and 
interview witnesses in his favor who had left WordPerfect and were 
residing in other parts of the country. 
Certainly this was not a fair hearing where so many exhibits 
and witnesses were called and the hearing lasted so long that there 
was no possible way for the counsel representing Mr. Karbakhsh to 
provide adequate and responsive representation of his interests, 
even for the modest fees requested, let alone the One Thousand Four 
Hundred Thirty-six and 50/100 Dollars ($1,436.50) allowed by the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
Regarding the due process argument, the gist of the Appelleefs 
claim is that, Mr. Karbakhsh was not denied due process because he 
was fairly and adequately represented. In the present situation, 
what constitutes fair and adequate representation can only be 
ascertained with reference to factual details of the actual 
hearings. 
The record establishes that the employer monopolized the 
hearings and that the claimant's representation comprised only a 
small fraction of the total proceedings. The facts given above 
disprove the Board's assertion that both parties were adequately 
represented. Unemployment compensation hearings are designed to 
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provide a simplified and less-expensive forum for benefits 
claimants, who might not otherwise have the financial capacity to 
undertake legal proceedings against their employers. As such, 
these proceedings are provided to ensure the protection of the 
claimant's rights. In the instant case, the wealthy employer chose 
to perform what can only be characterized as a pre-emptive strike 
against the claimant. The mass of evidence presented was totally 
out of character with the fundamental nature of such hearings, 
clearly evidenced by the total time of the proceedings and the 
employer's monopolization of the proceedings. As such, this alone 
raises doubts about the due process validity of the instant 
hearings. 
Even so, once the Administrative Law Judge had deemed it 
proper to allow the wealthy employer considerably greater 
representation than is normal in such hearings, then a similar 
opportunity had to be accorded to the claimant not merely as a 
matter of administrative discretion, but as a constitutionally 
guaranteed right to due process. Since the claimant's access to 
competent legal representation and securing witnesses on his behalf 
was severely hampered by his limited financial abilities, said 
hearings failed to qualify as an adequate due process safeguard of 
claimantfs property rights. Therefore, after having made the 
determination of allowing the employer considerably 
disproportionate representation, especially in this situation where 
the employer was a wealthy corporation and expended many times the 
expenses availed of by the claimant, it is a gross violation of the 
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concept of fair and equitable representation to allow the claimant 
only 2 5 percent (25%) of his expected recovery, in legal fees. 
The claimant was therefore denied due process during his 
unemployment compensation benefits claims hearings. 
POINT III 
THE LIMITATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE IS AN 
EFFECTIVE DENIAL OF A REMEDY BY DUE COURSE OF LAW, UNDER SECTION 11 
OF ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
The right to advice and assistance of retained counsel in 
civil litigation is implicit in the concept of due process. In an 
adversarial system of justice, representation by counsel is 
indispensable to effective protection of individual rights. 
Pursuant to Section 7 of Article I of the constitution of the State 
of Utah, In this case, the limitation upon the fees allowed by the 
Administrative Law Judge effectively prohibited Mr. Karbakhsh from 
obtaining a fair hearing. Fair hearings imply at least a 
relatively level playing field. In this case, the wealth of the 
employer was displayed in the evidence adduced at the hearing. 
There was no possible way for the claimant to compete. After the 
employer had presented its case in chief, practically all of the 
resources of the claimant were exhausted and there was so little 
left that there was no hope of obtaining assistance of counsel in 
the prosecution of an appeal of the decision or continuing 
representation in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
action or the wrongful termination claim. Referring to the pre-
emptive strike analogy again, the employer was allowed such 
considerable superiority of representation during the hearings, 
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that the claimanl. did nnl have any real chance of effectively 
preser. i><* «nja i m;,! ^urh quantitatively insurmountable 
evidence, given his modest financial means. 
Fundamental adversarial system of justice is the 
c^r^r&r- " cbamr clients. If 
one :„;, . r- unlimited weapons while the other has 
b back/1 the fairness of the proceeding must be 
questioned. 
I llowing the employer *-° use a 
IOE.C waile limiting the claimant to fees 25 
percei ^^ maximum ' the 
claimant, while perhaps understandable parental funct f 
1 aimant - . n improvident 
contracts, amounts denial ast is 
rigged so there effectively :hance one ol combatants can 
prevdiI„ UiCM i ui hearing within the concept 
of cine process, 
POINT IV 
A LIMITATION OF ATTORNEYS FEES IS, IN THIS INSTANCE, EFFECTIVELY 
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW PURSUANT TO SECTION I OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
e Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution guarantees 
proceeding where their property interests are at stake, 
m e representations * the claimant and the 
employe - ^ ^ hearings yui 
also became fundamental-^ unfair :laiman , ou access *o 
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adequate legal representation is further being hampered by the 
application of the fee limitation rule. 
The right to advice and assistance of retained counsel which 
is implicit in the concept of due process is eviscerated if there 
is no provision for fair compensation in a hearing in which the 
employer may dominate the hearing time through the calling of many 
paid witnesses while the claimant is denied justice because his 
meager resources essentially require that he find counsel willing 
to represent him at far less than the usual rate of compensation, 
let alone represent him on an appeal from the ruling of the 
Administrative Law Judge. As such, the Boardfs decision violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition of denying any citizen his 
right to property without due process of law. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW, PURSUANT TO SECTION 1 OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, WHERE 
THE BOARD CONSIDERED EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS OUTSIDE THE RECORD, 
WITHOUT ALLOWING APPELLANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD TO PRESENT 
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENTS. 
In B.F. Goodrich Co, v. State Industrial Court, 429 P.2d 787 
(Okla. 1967), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that due process of 
law inexorably requires that adversary parties before the State 
Industrial Court be given proper notice and opportunity to be heard 
before any of their substantial rights are altered or affected. In 
the instant case, the decision to limit the Appellant's fees was 
taken prior to any intimation to the Appellant by the 
Administrative Law Judge that the same was about to happen, and 
without any opportunity whatsoever to the Appellant to argue for an 
20 
except percent (25%) rule. 
Tne . , 11 i • i r; ion a f J ! ft) ' imitation, 
failed -,. ^ a from Appeiian 
property rights were circumscribe* ithout any hearing and 
consIdered evIdei :ti ::e i 1 : !:: i i ,  11 le i :ec bu^a action x^ 
inconsistent wi th due process where the Board states: 
"The claimant chose to appeal the decision of the ALJ denying 
benefits but the money provided to the law firm as a retainer 
was exhausted. The claimant, therefore, chose to be 
represented at the Board of Review by his non-attorney wife, 
who wrote a brief and provided excellent representation for 
the claimant. The claimant chose not to appeal the Board of 
Review's denial of benefits and has made no claim that his 
failure to appeal the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals was 
due to an inabil ity to obtain adequate representation." (R. at 
63) 
The record on the appea ,-; devoid nl i • IJi.-nri .LI|.(MJJ I 11 i\ m t r 
of the statements or conclusions made in the above-quoted material. 
i^ MI cui opportunity prior I «» the 
decisj rv .;• »-;. • i r ; t.. * ^ i d e n c e c o n s i d e r e i > f 
R e v i e w o u t - • ;{'-• * * r a .^-; relied making its 
decision. heard without 
the - ,v* .. - opportunity present its argument bet cm* Hie 
The Boai decisi " ' li« ' «,« «"» i I « «f'i»|j«*.>l i> I i> failed to 
show that the claimant v . -, denied . process as < , .Limitation 
1
 ( I i t ! upeciou -gument best. 
According to trie tacts already prese e 
hea r i tigs wen• o I exceptiona] length and duration, thereby 
UL. L»J11) i • 11111' j i in 11 complex nature of the 
proceedings. Further, • established that M M < • mil»i * «> < i s 
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case in chief comprised of evidence and testimony that indisputably 
is excessive for the fee contemplated in this type of proceeding. 
Therefore, it can be established that the Appellants claims are 
justified by the rendition of services commensurate with the nature 
and complexity of the proceedings involved. Despite these 
inferences, the Board claims that the Appellant cannot claim the 
fees, unless it shows that the underlying claimants due process 
rights will be violated if Appellant is denied these fees after 
having provided the services. This is clearly a misapplication of 
the relevant rule. 
After establishing that the complexity of the proceedings and 
the level of services rendered, which generated the fees, is 
justified, it defies reason to argue that the Appellant has to 
further prove a future violation of due process to be successful in 
its claim. Appellant respectfully submits for the Court's 
consideration that such a grossly unreasonable application could 
never have been intended by the drafter's of rule 562-18b-3.5. 
Clearly, a determination of the reasonableness of legal services 
required to satisfy due process requirements in an administrative 
proceeding, and which further justify a waiver of the fee 
limitation rule, cannot be conducted after such services have been 
satisfactorily rendered. If indeed such services were necessary to 
safeguard the due process rights of the underlying claimant, then 
such rights of the underlying claimant can never be hurt by denying 
the attorney's fees to the Appellant, as Appellant has arguably 
already protected the due process rights of the underlying 
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claimant, 
T 
are at stake, and the Board was irrational in linking Appellant's 
claim with a showinc iolation of the underlying claimant's 
future due process r h\\\n i M I H iiaii aiieddy iniiHlf\n;stl 
competent services commensurate protect the due process rights 
c claimant. ±n Board fail/ >erceive this 
critical distinct : ™ *nc\ a*
 ( % 
overturned. 
1 sserts that the facts associated with 
the unemployment insurance case before the Administrative l^e 
had already been reviewed by the Appellants connection with its 
r e p r e s e n t a t :i <:: • i i • :: • f 11: 1 =; • ::  ] a :i in a i 1 oroceedin wh i ch 
Appellants had already been paid. (R. ii"i nis 
assertion untrue and fails to find any support from the record, the 
Board comp] e I::e] y pr e c] i ided the Appe] :i i ig the same 
to show that Appellant was properly entitled to the claimed amount 
Q £ attorney's fees. 
The pol icy e 
Code Rule 562-18B-3.5 were succinctl nunciated. in Thatcher, 
supra, that the attorney's fees limitation is designed to provide 
the claimanl in unemployment compensation p r o c e e d i n g s # t 
possible benefit of any recovery, and to prevent such recovery from 
bei i ig c s i 1 •] , J lees. Howevei hatcher clearly 
stated that any such ^ , n^ wa? subject to requiremem f 
reasonableness, and , '_.__ nature tlle services provided was 
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germane to the determination of fees. Further, Rule 562-18b-3.5 
itself embodies an exception to the 25 percent (25%) limitation if 
the claimant's due process rights are compromised. 
It is indisputably established that the proceedings forming 
the underlying basis of Appellant's claim were considerably more 
lengthy and complex than the average hearings involved in 
unemployment compensation claims. As such, Appellantfs claims for 
a waiver of the fee limitation qualifies under the Thatcher 
analysis: 
In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to 
consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty 
and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill 
requisite properly to conduct the cause; (2) whether the 
acceptance of employment in the particular case will 
preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases 
likely to arise out of the transaction and in which there 
is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be 
employed, or would involve the loss of other employment 
while employed in the particular case or antagonisms with 
other clients; (3) the customary charges of the Bar for 
similar services; (4) the amount involved in the 
controversy and for the benefits resulting to the client 
from the services; (5) the contingency or certainty of 
the compensation; and (6) the character of the 
employment, whether casual or for an established and 
constant client. No one of these considerations in 
itself is controlling. Id. 
In this case, counsel spent a combined total time of 41.9 
hours from the time they were retained by Mr. Karbakhsh to and 
including the decision of the Department of Employment Security. 
Appellant has spent considerable additional time in pursuing its 
petition for approval of the fee and now in this appeal. Based on 
the number of hours spent by Appellant in representing Mr. 
Karbakhsh before the Department of Employment Security and based 
upon an agreement reached between Mr. Karbakhsh and Appellant for 
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compensation for legal services. Appellant contends that 
sand 
Three Hundred Dollars ($4,300.00) , an amount consistent with hourly 
rates charged by attorneys practicing the Utah County area, and 
-sei. 
for Approval Appellant submittec A** 9 
hour actual time spent counsel was 
them were present. dministrative allowed One 
Thousand Four Hundred Thirty-six and 50/100 Dollars ($1,436.50) 
Dollar •' • , .,:r * * attorney time Jhe fees allowed for 
the tir«~ expended * -• * -' short modest amount requested 
are to 
the usual overhead requirements involved in running a law office. 
, uneLe was no possible 
way . repress larbakhsh o^ ^n appeal ol the 
decisic ,- • : - ru Administrative Law Judge, Howeve: Appellant 
c]aim. Therefore, the due process rights granted Appellant 
under the United States Constitution were violated. 
" , * i ;,i *: above, Appellants respectfully 
request this C o m ' * ^ V ^ T < - *'-• ^ ^ * "he Board of Review 
anij HI mi I II K i u , . . i i i n I " 
Hundred Dol. alternative to remand 
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case to the Board of Review with instructions to amend the 
attorneyfs fee award to be consistent with this Court's opinion. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 1994. 
r
rENS P^. FUGAL^ 
Attorney f^jrAppellant 
GARY |pT~w£lGHT 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two (2) 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Winston M. Faux, 
Attorney for Appellee, at P.O. Box 11600, Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
this 3rd day of January, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitution of the U'nii- States, Fourteenth 
Amendment, Sectior 
c 
Constitution Utah, Sect. 
Utah Administrat / * J<-, R562-18b— 5 
L 
Utah Code Annotatec 4-5(b) 
Utah Code Annotated, §63-46b-16(4^ 
U t a h Codtj i I,Itj 
Utah Code Annotatec 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
(Rights retained by people.) 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.! 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-
lot, the President. But in choosing the President, the 
votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President when-
ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, be-
fore the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of 
the death or other constitutional disability of the 
President—The person having the greatest number 
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole num-
ber of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then irom tne two IMKU*^I ••«•»•»_.w „.. 
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President: a 
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Pres-
ident shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the 
United States. 
AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 
1. [Slavery prohibited.! 
2. I Power to enforce amendment.! 
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.! 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion. 
Sec. 2. (Power to enforce amendment] 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protec-
tion.) 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.) 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.) 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid.) 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.) 
Section I. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. (Representatives — Power to reduce ap-
pointment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to 
vote at any election for the choice of electors for Presi-
dent and Vice-President of the United States, Repre-
sentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citi-
zens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in 
the proportion which the number of such male citi-
zens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
S e c 3. (Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in 
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President, 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. 
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XL 
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Declaration of Rights 
State Boundaries 
Ordinance 
Elections and Right of Suffrage 
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Legislative Department 
Executive Department 
Judicial Department 
Congressional and Legislative Apporti 
ment 
Education 
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Public Debt 
Militia 
Labor 
Water Rights 
Forestry 
Public Buildings and State Institutions 
Public Lands 
Salaries 
Miscellaneous 
Amendment and Revision 
Schedule 
P R E A M B L E 
Grateful to Almighty God for la abet ty, we, 
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate 
the principles of free government, do ordain and es-
tablish this CONSTITt JTION. 1896 
A R T I C L E 1 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. (Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. (All political power inheren t in the people. 1 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4 I Religious l iberty — No property qualification i to 
vote or hold office.! 
5. [Habeas corpus.I 
6. I Right to bear a rms . j 
7. |Due process of law.] 
8. (Offenses bailable.! 
9. (Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments . 1 
10. (Trial by jury. l 
11. (Courts open — Redress of injuries.! 
12. (Rights of accused persons.! 
13. |Prosecution by information or indictment 
Grand jury . ! 
14. II In reasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant .! 
15. (Freedom of speech and of the press - Libel.) 
16. (No imprisonment for debt — Exception. 1 
17. (Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. (Attainder — Ex. post facto laws — Impaii n: ig 
contracts.! 
19. (Treason defined — Proof.) 
20. JMilitary subordinate to the civil power I 
2 1 . (Slavery forbidden. I 
22. (Private property for public use.I 
23. iIrrevocable franchises forbidden I 
Section 
24. (Uniform operation of laws.j 
25. {Rights retained by people.) 
26. (Provisions mandatory and pn 
27. (Fundamental rights.] 
Section 1. (Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right 1896 
Sec. 2. (All political power inherent in the peo-
ple.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments a re founded on the i r au tho r i ty for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have t h e 
r igh t to alter or reform thei r government as t h e pub-
1 ic welfare m a y requi re 1896 
Sec . 3 . (Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable pa r t of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land. isse 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualifi-
cation to vote or hold office.] 
The r ights of conscience shall never be infringed. 
The State shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a quali-
fication for any office of public t rus t or for any vote a t 
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as 
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church 
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or prop-
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any reli-
gious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the sup-
port of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property 
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
1896 
Sec. 5. (Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety requires it. 1896 
Sec, 6. [Right to beai arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear 
arms for security and defense of self, family, others, 
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful pur-
poses shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall 
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use 
of arms. 1984 
Sec. 7. [Due p r o c e s s of law,"J 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law 1896 
Sec 8. (Offenses bailable.! 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail 
able except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge; or 
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(b) persons charged with a felony while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, des-
ignated by s ta tu te as one for which bail may be 
denied, if there is subs tant ia l evidence to support 
the charge and the court finds by clear and con-
vincing evidence tha t the person would consti-
tu te a subs tant ia l danger to any other person or 
to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdic-
tion of the court if released on bail . 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime a re bailable pend-
ing appeal only as prescribed by law. 1980 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments.J 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 1896 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.) 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
p a r t y . 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com* 
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
1896 
S e c 13. [Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment The for-
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.) 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — 
Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the 
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party 
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Excep-
tion.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im-
pairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civi l 
power. ] 
The mili tary shall be in strict subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be 
quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner; nor in t ime of war except in a m a n n e r to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this 
State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without jus t compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed grant ing irrevocably any 
franchise, privilege or immunity. 1896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operat ion of laws. ] 
All laws of a general na tu re shall have uniform 
operation. 1896 
Sec 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
to impair or deny others retained by the people. 1896 
biltties Including Interest and penalties which have not 
been collected within eight years after the issuance of a 
warrant will be written off, unless payments are being 
received consistent with an installment agreement or 
court order. All collection or offset action shall cease. 
The debt will be forgiven snd forgotten as though no 
such debt ever existed snd it will be removed from the 
Department records. When an overpayment for fraud 
established under Section 6(e) is removed from Depart-
ment records, the claimant may receive waiting week 
credit and future benefits may be paid without refer-
ence to the prior Section 6(e) overpayment 
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R562-18b. Approval of Counsel Fees* 
R562-18b-l. General Definition. 
R562-18b-2. Procedure, 
R562-18b-3. Criteria for Evaluation of Fee Petition. 
R562-18b-4. Appeal Rights. 
R562-18b-l. General Definition. 
The intent of Section 35-4-18(b) is to protect the inter-
eats of the claimant who is dependent on his benefits as 
a meana of livelihood during his period of unemploy-
ment. The Act does not address fees charged to employ-
era by their representatives as employers are deemed to 
be more knowledgeable in the marketplace and gener-
ally not in need of such safeguards, 
R£62-18b-JL Procedure, 
If a fee is to be charged a written petition for approval 
of fee must be submitted by the claimant's representa-
tive to the Administrative Law Judge before whom the 
representative appeared, or to the Chief Administrative 
Law Judge if no hearing was scheduled. An approval 
form can be obtained through the appeals office. The fee 
may be approved as requested or a lesser amount may 
be approved depending upon the appropriateness and 
justification of the request 
R562*18b*3. Criteria for Evaluat ion of Fee 
Petit ion. 
Tho appropriateness of the fee will be determined 
baaed on the following criteria: 
1. Complexity of Issues Involved 
A case Involving several complex Issues would obvi-
ously require greater preparation. However, services 
performed which add nothing to the presentation of the 
case are to be avoided. For example: A simple case hav-
ing only one legal issue such as a voluntary quit would 
not normally require more than two hours of prepara-
tion time. The same is true for most work search issues. 
2. Time Actually Spent In: 
a. preparation of the case 
b. attending the hearing 
c. preparation of a brief (if required) 
A brief should be submitted only when requested or 
approved by the Administrative Law Judge. If a brief is 
submitted which is not requested or necessary, the 
approved fee may be reduced by the charges for time 
spent on the brief. 
a. preparedness of the representative 
b. organiration and presentation of the case 
c. avoidance of undue delays 
Documents and witnesses should be made available 
at the time scheduled for the hearing and postpone-
ments should not be required except in unusual circum-
stances. Every effort should be made to go forward with 
the hearing when it is originally scheduled especially in 
benefit cases as claimants are frequently entirely with-
out income during the course of the appeal processes if 
benefits have been denied or if benefits have been 
allowed, excessive overpayments may be created. In 
recognition of the due process right for payment when 
due, the Department of Labor has established a federal 
standard requiring that 60% of all appeals decisions be 
issued within 30 days of the date the appeal is filed. 
Therefore, unnecessary delays justify a reduction in the 
approved fee to the representative, 
d. necessity of representation 
If it is clearly demonstrated that the claimant was not 
In need of representation because of the simplicity of 
the case or the lack of preparation on the part of the 
representative only a minimal fee may be approved. 
4. Prevailing Fee 
The prevailing fee is the rate charged by others for the 
same type of service. In determining the prevailing fee 
for the service rendered, credence will be given to infor-
mation obtained from the Utah State Bar Association, 
Lawyer's Referral Service, or other similar organiza-
tions as well as determinations previously rendered by 
the Appeals Tribunal 
6. Limitation on Amount of the Fee 
Fees will not be approved in excess of 25% of the 
claimant's maximum unemployment benefit entitle-
ment unless such a limitation would preclude the 
claimant from pursuing an appeal to the Supreme 
Court or would preclude in some other way an opportu-
nity for due process, 
RG62-18b-4. Appeal Rights. 
Should the representative disagree with the ruling of 
the Administrative Law Judge, a written appeal may be 
made to the Board of Review within ten days from the 
date of issuance of the decision, l^ta appeal must set 
forth the grounds upon which the complaint la made. 
KET: Mittatptoym«at comjMtiMtloe, *oun»el«c* 
1*T S M - 1 * 
R662-19a. Prosecution. 
R562-19a-L General Definition. 
R562-19a-2. Guidelines for Referring Cases of Frsud to 
the Courts. 
R562-19a-L General Definition* 
The intent of this section of the Act is to assess penal' 
ties beyond those administered by the Department as 
provided by Section 35-4-5<e). As it would be impracti-
cal and beyond the intent of the law to prosecute all 
cases of fraud in the courts, it is left to the Department 
to determine which cases will be presented to the courM 
for addition*! civil pensltii*. A Prosecution BoaW 
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(a) For the week in which the claimant left 
work voluntarily without good cause, if so found 
by the commission, and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has performed services in 
bona fide, covered employment and earned wages 
for those services equal to at least six times the 
claimant's weekly benefit amount. A cfai'mant 
shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the 
claimant leaves work under circumstances of 
such a nature that it would be contrary to equity 
and good conscience to impose a disqualification. 
The commission shall, in cooperation with the 
employer, consider for the purposes of this chap-
ter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a 
genuine continuing attachment to the labor mar-
ket in reaching a determination of whether the 
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity 
and good conscience. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
section, a claimant who has left work voluntarily 
to accompany, follow, or join his or her spouse to 
or in a new locality does so without good cause 
for purposes of this subsection. 
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant 
was discharged for just cause or for an act or 
omission in connection with employment, 
not constituting a crime, which is deliberate, 
willful, or wanton and adverse to the em-
ployer's rightful interest, if so found by the 
commission, and thereafter until the claim-
ant has earned an amount equal to at least 
six times the claimants weekly benefit 
amount in bona fide covered employment. 
(2) For the week in which he was dis-
charged for dishonesty constituting a crime 
or any felony or class A misdemeanor in con-
nection with his work as shown by the facts, 
together with his admission, or as shown by 
his conviction in a court of competent juris-
diction of that crime and for the 51 next fol-
lowing weeks and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has performed services in 
bona fide covered employment and earned 
wages for those services equal to at least six 
times the claimant's weekly benefit amount. 
If by reason of his alleged dishonesty or 
crime in connection with his work, the indi-
vidual is held in legal custody or is free on 
bail, any determination of his eligibility 
shall be held in abeyance pending his release 
or conviction. 
(c) If the commission finds that the claimant 
has failed without good cause to properly apply 
for available suitable work, to accept a referral to 
suitable work offered by the employment office, 
or to accept suitable work offered by an employer 
or the employment office. The ineligibility con-
tinues until the claimant has performed services 
in bona fide covered employment and earned 
wages for the services in an amount equal to at 
least six times the claimant's weekly benefit 
amount. A claimant shall not be denied eligibil-
ity for benefits for failure to apply, accept refer-
ral, or accept available suitable work under cir-
cumstances of such a nature that it would be con-
trary to equity and good conscience to impose a 
disqualification. 
The commission shall consider the purposes of 
this chapter, the reasonableness of the claimant's 
actions, and the extent to which the actions evi-
dence a genuine continuing attachment to the 
labor market in reaching a determination of 
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is con-
trary to equity and good conscience. 
(1) In determining whether or not work is 
suitable for an individual, the commission 
shall consider the degree of risk involved to 
his heafth, safety, and morals, his physical 
fitness and prior training, his prior earnings 
and experience, his length of unemployment 
and prospects for securing local work in his 
customary occupation, the wages for similar 
work in the locality, and the distance of the 
available work from his residence. 
Prior earnings shall be considered on the 
basis of all four quarters used in establishing 
eligibility and not just the earnings from the 
most recent employer. The commission shall 
be more prone to find work as suitable the 
longer the claimant has been unemployed 
and the less likely the prospects are to secure 
local work in his customary occupation. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision 
of this chapter, no work is suitable, and ben-
efits shall not be denied under this chapter 
to any otherwise eligible individual for re-
fusing to accept new work under any of the 
following conditions: 
(i) if the position offered is vacant due 
directly to a strike, lockout, or other 
labor dispute; 
(ii) if the wages, hours, or other condi-
tions of the work offered are substan-
tially less favorable to the individual 
than those prevailing for similar work 
in the locality; or 
(iii) if as a condition of being em-
ployed the individual would be required 
to join a company union or to resign 
from or refrain from joining any bona 
fide labor organization, 
(d) For any week in which the commission 
finds that his unemployment is due to a stoppage 
of work which exists because of a strike involving 
his grade, class, or group of workers at the fac-
tory or establishment at which he is or was last 
employed. 
(1) If the commission finds that a strike 
has been fomented by a worker of any em-
ployer, none of the workers of the grade, 
class, or group of workers of the individual 
who is found to be a party to the plan, or 
agreement to foment a strike, shall be eligi-
ble for benefits. However, if the commission 
finds that the strike is caused by the failure 
or refusal of any employer to conform to the 
provisions of any law of the state of Utah or 
of the United States pertaining to hours, 
wages, or other conditions of work, the strike 
shall not render the workers ineligible for 
benefits. 
(2) If the commission finds that the em-
ployer, his agent or representative has con-
spired, planned, or agreed with any of his 
workers, their agents or representatives to 
foment a strike, that strike shall not render 
the workers ineligible for benefits. 
(3) A worker may receive benefits if, sub-
sequent to his unemployment because of a 
strike as defined in Subsection (d), he has 
obtained employment and has been paid 
wages of not less than the amount specified 
in Subsection 35-4-3(d) and has worked as 
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the 
statute governing the agency or, in the absence 
of such a venue provision, in the county where 
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal 
place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the 
party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the 
respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency 
action to be reviewed, together with a dupli-
cate copy, summary, or brief description of 
the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were 
parties in the informal adjudicative proceed-
ings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from 
the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party 
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain 
judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the 
type and extent of relief requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the 
petitioner is entitled to relief, 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in 
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall de-
termine ail questions of fact and law and any 
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judi-
cial proceedings under this section. 1990 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency ac-
tion resulting from formal adjudicative proceed-
ings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review 
of agency action with the appropriate appellate 
court in the form required by the appellate rules 
of the appropriate appellate court 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
pellate court shall govern all additional filings 
and proceedings in the appellate court 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the 
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudica-
tive proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except tha t 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of pre-
paring transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably re-
fuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of 
law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule 
which the agency action is based, is unconsti 
tional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisc 
tion conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issi 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pi 
cedure or decision-making process, or has fail 
to follow prescribed procedure; 
(0 the persons taking the agency action we 
illegally constituted as a decision-making bo< 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a detenu 
nation of fact, made or implied by the agenc 
that is not supported by substantial evident 
when viewed in light of the whole record befor 
the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated t 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior prac 
tice, unless the agency justifies the inconsis 
tency by giving facts and reasons that dem-
onstrate a fair and rational basis for the in-
consistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious, uet 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings by the district court or the re? 
view of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-i 
pellate court, the court may award damages or( 
compensation only to the extent expressly auth*3 
rized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by lawfj 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discr^ 
tion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;^ 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date d 
agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency foi 
further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review ol 
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, 
if authorized by statute. lttri 
63~46b-l& Judicial review — Stay and othei 
temporary remedies pending final dis-
position. 
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the 
agency may grant a stay of its order or other tempo-
rary remedy during the pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's rules. 
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or 
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary cir-
cumstances require immediate judicial intervention. 
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other tem-
porary remedies requested by a party, the agency's 
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall 
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary 
remedy was not granted. 
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other tempo-
rary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or 
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may 
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it 
finds that: 
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(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Su-
preme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, ex-
cept: 
fa) capital felony convictions or an appeal of 
an interlocutory order of a court of record involv-
ing a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and 
(e) those matters described in Subsections 
(3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but 
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3Kb). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1992 
78-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state 
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote 
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize 
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, arid 
admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to 
the practice of law. i»86 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation 
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The 
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab-
lished by the appellate court administrator, and 
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court. 
1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance 
and services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986. 1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF A P P E A L S 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions 
— Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and 
shall have a seal.
 1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Func-
tions — Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. 
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the 
Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of 
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and com-
mences on the first Monday in January, next follow-
ing the date of election. A judge whose term expires 
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until 
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court??7 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court. m* 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(21 The Court of Appeafe has appelate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor* 
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex>, 
cept the Public Service Commission, State .Tai^  
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of .Oil* 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review , 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies/pi 
political subdivisions of the state or other to; 
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action undcS 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
